A new book called When Governments Lobby Governments, written by Zhang Youlang, professor of the School of Public Administration and Policy, Renmin University of China (RUC) was published by Cambridge University Press recently.

Introduction

Why are some subnational governments more likely to lobby the national government than others? Extant research in social sciences has widely discussed lobbying dynamics in the private sector. However, governments lobby governments too. In the United States, lobbying is a popular strategy for state and local governments to obtain resources from and influence policies in the federal government. Nevertheless, extant research offers limited theoretical analysis or empirical evidence on this phenomenon. This Element provides a comprehensive study of intergovernmental lobbying activities in the United States and, in particular, an institutional analysis of the lobbying decisions of state and local governments. The study findings contribute to public administration, public policy, and political science literature by offering theoretical and empirical insights into the institutional factors that might influence subnational policymaking, fiscal resource management, intergovernmental relations, and democratic representation.

Catalog

Section 1 Introduction

Intergovernmental Lobbying in the United States

Qualitative Observations 

Overview of Sections

Section 2 Executive Institutions and Lobbying Activities of City Governments

Theoretical Analysis

Evidence

Summary

Section 3 Legislative Professionalism and State Lobbying Activities

Theoretical Analysis

Evidence

Summary

Section 4 Bottom-Up Federalism of Lobbying Investment

Theoretical Analysis

Evidence

Summary

Section 5. CONCLUSION

Highlights of the Main Findings

Theoretical and Practical Implications

Concluding Thoughts on a Future Research Agenda